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Abstract 
‘Macrocognition’ is a nascent area of knowledge engineering that focuses on 
understanding how cognition emerges in natural environments. One goal for 
studying macrocognition is to understand the complexity entailed in inter- and 
intra-individual cognition. The goal of the research reported here is to better 
understand how team collaboration influences and facilitates the team’s task 
performance. In this paper we describe our analysis of several complex team 
collaboration tasks: (a) firefighters from the Fire Department of New York on 
September 11, 2001, (b) air warfare teams on an Aegis ship, and (c) the team 
collaboration entailed in conducting Maritime Interdiction Operations. Team 
communications that transpired during three complex problem solving situations 
were analyzed to understand how teams collaborate to create new knowledge and 
decide on a course of action during complex, one-of-a-kind problems. Commun-
ications were analyzed using definitions of cognitive processes included in a 
conceptual model of team collaboration. These processes include: (1) individual 
knowledge building, (2) developing knowledge interoperability, (3) developing 
team shared understanding, and (4) team consensus. The way the team’s cognitive 
behavior maps to the model of team collaboration is discussed along with 




‘Macrocognition’ is an emerging field within the area of cognitive engineering that describes the 
way cognition occurs in naturalistic, or real-world, decision-making events. Macrocognition is 
defined as the internalized and externalized high-level mental processes employed by teams to 
create new knowledge during complex, one-of-a kind, collaborative problem solving (Letsky, 
Warner, Fiore, Rosen, and Salas, 2007). The goal for this research is to understand the role of 
cognition in teams who are collaborating to solve complex, one-of-a kind problems, such as: (a) 
firefighters responding to the events of September 11, 2001, (b) a boarding party conducting 
Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO), (c) a Navy shipboard combat information center team 
responding to air warfare threats, or (d) an ad hoc inter-agency team responding to a 
humanitarian assistance/ disaster relief situation. This research focuses on the contextually bound 
processes entailed in sense making, managing uncertainty, and related cognitive processes 
entailed in responding to emerging events that occur in dynamic decision-making situations 
(Fiore, Rosen, Salas, Burke, & Jentsch, 2008).  
 
Team communications data from three decision-making situations (a series of field experiments, 
a series of laboratory experiments, and a real-real event) where a team of people collaborate to 
solve a complex problem were analyzed and reported on previously (Hutchins, Bordetsky, 
Kendall, and Garrity, 2007). This paper extends our analysis by examining similarities and 
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 differences in team collaboration patterns across three decision-making domains. In this series of 
studies we analyzed data obtained from teams and tasks characterized by the following 
descriptions. Team types include teams who employ asynchronous communications among 
distributed team members, may be culturally diverse, and where team members bring their 
heterogeneous knowledge to bear to solve the problem. In these complex situations each team 
member plays a unique role, team members operate within a command structure, and in some 
situations involve rotating team members. Collaborative problem-solving situations include time 
pressure, information/ knowledge uncertainty, dynamic information, large amounts of knowledge 
(cognitive overload), and human-agent interface complexity.   
 
The purpose of this effort is to provide support to the Office of Naval Research (ONR) 
Collaboration and Knowledge Integration (CKI) Program’s goal to improve the effectiveness of 
team decision making in complex, data-rich situations. This includes developing a better 
understanding of the cognitive processes employed when teams collaborate to solve problems. 
The focus is on FORCEnet type issues such as the MIO task that entails detecting a moving 
vessel emitting signs of ionizing radiation, followed by a boarding of that vessel. The vessel is 
boarded to take fingerprints or other biometrics and to perform a search for contraband. Results 
of the boarding may need to be communicated back to command elements on land and to remote 
experts for analysis. After successful analysis, key decision makers may collaborate to determine 
the appropriate course of action.  
 
Team Collaboration  
Collaborating teams are ubiquitous with examples of tasks requiring collaboration encompassing 
an ever increasing range of situations. Medical specialists in India provide second opinions and  
interpret medical results at times when medical specialists in the U.S. are in short supply (e.g., 
during weekends or in the middle of the night) (Friedman, 2006) and accountants half-way 
around the globe prepare income taxes at a fraction of the cost compared with U.S. accountants 
(Friedman, 2006). Scientists collaborate with researchers on a remote space station; and people 
on land collaborate with robotic geologists (Clancy, 2004). Military teams collaborate on plans 
and execution for a wide variety of mission areas. These teams all have characteristics in 
common – they engage in tasks that involve critical decisions and must often coordinate their 
activities to accomplish these tasks effectively.   
 
Model of Team Collaboration 
In this paper we report on research conducted to assist in evaluating and refining the ONR CKI 
Program’s model of team collaboration developed by Warner, Letsky, and Cowen (2005). This 
conceptual model emphasizes the cognitive aspects of team collaboration and includes the major 
human decision-making processes used during team collaboration. Operational tasks performed 
by teams whose collaborative cognitive behavior was analyzed include team data processing, 
team decision making, course of action selection, and developing shared understanding. The goal 
for this research is to: (a) gain insight into where the model can be improved and (b) determine 
how the macrocognitive processes included in the model contribute to team performance. The 
focus of the collaboration model is on knowledge building among the team members and 
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: 
 
Figure 1.  Model of Team Collaboration.  (From Warner, Letsky, & Cowen, 2004). 
 
Taking Actions as Part of Problem Solving  
Many tasks require rapid and accurate coordination of information and behavior to successfully 
cope with the demands of time-compressed, ambiguous situations with the threat of fatal 
consequences. The types of tasks that are described by the model of team collaboration are 
naturalistic decision making tasks, that is, where the focus is on recognition of situations and 
reflection processes where there is a continuous shift between thought and action (Lipshitz and 
Ben Shaul, 1996; Espevik, Johnson, Eid, and Thayer, 2006). In naturalistic decision-making 
tasks, where a recognition-primed decision strategy is typically employed, the current situation is 
compared with previously encountered situations, and actions that were taken in past similar 
situations that were successful in those situations, and the associated outcomes that were 
produced are used to make rapid decisions. Decision makers use their previous experience to 
implement different solutions to a series of problems (Espevik et al, 2006).   
 
Orasanu (1994) observes that team communications are used to accomplish tasks and also 
indicate the cognitive processes of individual team members. Following Orasanu, team 
communications serve three main functions related to problem solving: sharing information, 
directing actions, and reflecting thoughts. Sharing information, in the three decision-making 
domains covered in this paper, is used to inform the other team members of the evolving status 
of the situation regarding a team member’s understanding of the situation and to update team 
members as the team takes various actions to deal with the problem. Depending on the decision-
making domain, much of this communication relies on standard operating procedures to provide 
standardized ways of communicating, types of information to share, and pre-defined actions to 
be taken in response to specific situations.   
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 Directing action is the second critical function of team communications. This includes direct 
commands for routine actions for a wide variety of situations. It also includes action commands 
for dealing with problems, such as gathering information for a decision. In line with Orasanu’s 
analysis, the third function of team communications is sharing what one is thinking, as opposed 
to passing on information obtained from an external source. This type of communication is 




Verbatim transcripts were analyzed from two series of experiments, and one real-world event 
where teams collaborated to solve a complex problem: (a) MIO, (b) air warfare decision making, 
and (c) the communications that transpired between the firefighters of the Fire Department of 
New York (FDNY), on Sept. 11, 2001 (Fire Department of the City of New York, 2001). 
Transcripts included communications that occurred between all team members as well as with 
decision makers at the distributed sites. Team communications data were analyzed and coded 
using the cognitive process definitions developed by Warner, et al., (2004). This research builds 
on previous work to validate this model (Warner, et al, 2004). The current effort uses a similar 
methodology applied to three different decisionmaking scenarios. For definitions of the macro-
cognitive processes include in the model see Hutchins, Bordetsky, Kendall, and Garrity, 2007. 
 
Team Collaboration Tasks 
In all three problem-solving tasks decision making is difficult because the available information 
is often incomplete or ambiguous. Team members possess highly specialized knowledge that 
must be synthesized for all team members to develop a shared understanding of the problem: The 
inherent time pressure in these types of tactical situations creates a challenging decision-making 
situation. Problem solving situations that make use of multiple information sources and require 
collaborative analysis to develop a team shared understanding of the task, the environment, and 
the status of other collaborators, enhance the richness of the communications. A key enabler of 
collaborative decision making is a virtual aggregation of individuals, organizations, systems, 
infrastructure, and processes to create and share data, information, and knowledge that is needed 
for the team to plan, execute, and assess actions/operations. This team collaboration should 
enable a leader to make decisions better and faster than were previously possible.  
 
Collaborative information environments are intended to transform collaborative planning and 
decision making from a relatively sequential, hierarchical process to a more parallel approach 
that allows ‘virtual’ collaborative interaction by all organizations regardless of their location. 
Important components of collaborative environments include collaborative decision support and 
situational awareness tools to support the overall task.   
 
Cognitive Complexity of Scenarios 
Brief descriptions of the decision-making domains analyzed for this effort are provided below. 
 
Maritime Interdiction Operations. Scenarios used for the MIO experiments focus on detecting, 
identifying, and interdicting nuclear materials in open waters. The critical task involves the 
cognitively complex issue of discrimination, that is, how to determine the presence of contraband 
radiological material against a background containing multiple benign radiation sources. A 
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 variety of benign sources, such as smoke detectors, radiant signs, mantles used for camping 
lanterns, and a container load of bananas all can cause radiation detectors to alarm. For example, 
“smoke detectors contain small amounts of americium, radiant signs glow because they contain 
tritium, a radioactive hydrogen isotope, and bananas, contain a small fraction of potassium-40 
which emits ionizing radiation” (Schwoegler, 2006, p. 6).   
 
Technical expertise, provided by remotely-located experts, is required to interpret the radiolog-
ical signals emitted from complex detectors to enable on-site personnel to make the fine 
discriminations required. The boarding party is comprised of Coast Guard officers, as well as 
members of other local law enforcement agencies who collaborate with remotely-located experts. 
During a MIO, distributed experts collaborate to determine whether the detected material 
represents a risk and support the on-site operators in deciding how to handle suspect material. 
Performing these complex discriminations is made possible by the collaborative capability 
provided by the collaborative workspace in terms of bringing remote expertise to the vessel 
undergoing the search and the ability to rapidly send and receive communications and data files 
between a diverse team of experts who all bring their respective expertise to bear to deal with a 
potentially high-threat situation.  
 
The objective of the MIO experiments is to evaluate the use of networks, advanced sensors, and 
collaborative technology for conducting rapid MIOs. Specifically, the ability of a boarding party 
to rapidly set up ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore communications in order to simultaneously 
search for radiation/ explosive sources and conduct biometrics identification while maintaining 
contact with the boarding vessel and remote collaborators. The goal is to enable geographically 
distributed command centers and subject matter experts to collaborate with the boarding party in 
real time, facilitating situational understanding, course of action selection, and execution 
(Bordetsky, Clement, and Vega, 2007). 
 
Air Warfare. Air warfare decisionmaking is conducted in the combat information center (CIC) 
of a Navy ship. The team is responsible for identifying and responding to a large number of air 
tracks under high time pressure. These air tracks can fit multiple hypotheses regarding the level 
of threat they pose to the battlegroup due to the high level of ambiguity associated with the data. 
Incoming information arrives via various sensor systems (radar, electronic support measures 
system, identification friend or foe, etc.), and various reports, e.g., intelligence reports, passed 
by other platforms in the area. Communications between team members are passed as soon as 
information is received and updated reports are passed as soon as new information is obtained 
for any track. In a series of speech turns, five separate contacts may be discussed at various 
levels – initial reports, updated reports, sharing information on the response, or lack of response, 
by the contact to some action taken by the ship, etc.   
 
Six collocated team members communicated with several non-collocated information sources, 
e.g., the battle group commander, the Saudi air tower, assets passing intelligence reports, other 
ships and friendly aircraft in the vicinity of the battlegroup, to gather additional information 
from them and keep them apprised of the unfolding scenario as they collaborated to identify air 
tracks. The global air warfare task involves identification and responding to numerous contacts.  
When an aircraft is detected, CIC personnel work as a team to determine the identity and to try 
to determine if the aircraft poses a threat. The high degree of ambiguity associated with contact 
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 information can often make threat assessment very difficult because many pieces of data can fit 
multiple hypotheses regarding threat assessment (Hutchins, Morrison, & Kelly, 1996). The 
global response choices (that is, do nothing, monitor, take various actions to determine intent, or 
engage) are largely determined by the ship’s orders and the current geopolitical situation. 
Specific actions depend on the local conditions and the relative positions of the inbound contact 




Table 1 depicts the results of analysis of three collaboration tasks:  four air warfare teams, three 
MIO teams, and the collaborative decision-making that transpired between firefighters from the 
FDNY. The percentage of speech turns for air warfare, MIO, and the 9-11 firefighting tasks 
coded as representing each of the macrocognitive processes included in the model is presented in 
Table 1. Analysis of the communications that transpired between firefighters and the dispatcher 
on September 11 indicates these firefighters used of more of the cognitive processes included in 
the model compared to teams during MIO experiments and air warfare decision making. 
(However, differences in the percentages of the cognitive processes used may also reflect the 
larger sample size of speech turns in the 9-11 data. The number of speech turns for each team is 
included in the bottom row of Table 1.) 
 
In general, the large number of speech turns coded as categories 1-4 of Table 1 reflects the huge 
emphasis on individual knowledge construction that is required for all three tasks. Of particular 
interest is the large number of speech turns coded as individual task knowledge (itk) development 
which reflects the high degree of uncertainty inherent in all three decision-making tasks. (Itk is 
defined as a team member asking for clarification to data or information). These high 
percentages of use of itk by decision makers in all three task domains indicate these teams 
devoted a large amount of effort to trying to manage this task uncertainty.   
 
Table 1. Percentage of Macrocognitive Processes Used by Teams for Three Different Tasks. 
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1  Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of speech turns in each  macrocognitive category.  
 
A majority of the communications for 9-11 involved knowledge construction and significantly 
less team communications for the other stages: collaborative team problem solving, team consen-
sus, and outcome evaluation and revision. Looking across all three decision-making domains, 
evidence was found for all seven macrocognitive processes that occur during the collaborative 
team problem solving phase (categories 7-13 in Table 1), where teams integrate individual 
knowledge to develop a team common understanding, indicating the role these cognitive 
processes play for teams who engaged in all three tasks. Far fewer speech turns were coded as 
representing processes included in the team consensus phase of collaboration (categories 14-18 
in Table 1). The macrocognitive codes with the smaller percentages show that the FDNY did not 
reach the later stages included in the team collaboration model. Most of their efforts were aimed 
at trying to figure out what was going on around them, which focused on gathering information 
and developing knowledge, and creating a mental model within which they could work. The 
small percentage of speech turns that were coded as macro-cognitive processes associated with 
team consensus and outcome evaluation and revision indicated that the course of action selection 
phase of air warfare, in particular, and to a lesser degree, MIO and firefighting, is not conducted 
in a collaborative manner.  
 
Patterns of Macrocognitive Processes Used by Firefighters 
One striking difference between the 9-11 data and the data from the two experiments (air warfare 
and MIO) is the difference in the number of speech turns coded as individual task knowledge 
(itk) development. Twenty-six percent of the total number of speech turns for the combined air 
warfare and MIO experiments were coded itk compared to a significantly larger percentage, i.e., 
41%, for 9-11 data (p<.0001, z=6.5, combined n=1555). The second largest difference in the use 
of the macrocognitive processes was, or team knowledge (tk) development, which comprised 7% 
for the combined experimental groups and 27% for the 9-11 data. Again, the difference was 
significant (p<.0001, z=11.03, n=1555). Itk and tk combined represent 32% of the experimental 
teams’ speech turns and a majority of speech turns for the 9-11 team (69%). A majority of the 
 8
 communications for 9-11 involved knowledge construction because of the completely 
unanticipated nature of the unfolding terrorist attack scenario.  
 
To see the full cycle of the collaboration stages and macrocognitive processes at work in the 
team collaboration for the FDNY on Sept. 11, the larger problem facing firefighters of search 
and rescue, and extinguishing the fire in the twin towers of the World Trade Center (WTC) needs 
to be broken into four smaller problems that correspond with each event that transpired that day. 
These events and the problems and resultant tasks to be performed to deal with each event are 
listed in Table 2. The FDNY team’s cognitive processing of the tasks for each of these four 
events follows the collaboration stages in the team collaboration model. For example, when the 
first plane hit the WTC, the problem involved determining what happened and creating a mental 
model within which the FDNY could work. With each new event (each aircraft hitting the WTC 
towers, collapse of the North and South Towers) the team had to form a new team problem 
model.  
 
Table 2.  Events, Team Mental Model and Tasks for FDNY on Sept 11, 2001. 
 
Time Event Team Mental Model Situation/ Tasks 
 8:47- 
 9:02 
First plane hit the  
World Trade Center  
Between plane impacts, it still  
could have been an accident 
• Evacuate South Tower 
• Gain knowledge of situation 
• Assign units to respond to the scene 
 9:03-  
 9:58 
Second plane hit the  
World Trade Center  
Definitely an attack but buildings 
could still withstand the impacts 
• Had to divide their resources between 
     the two tower lobbies for command 
     posts 
  9:59- 
10:28 
South Tower collapsed Complete chaos • How much was lost? 
• How many people were lost? 
• Complete loss of  SA (including C2) 
• Evacuate the North Tower 
10:29-
11:07 
North Tower collapsed Complete chaos • No idea of the breadth of the loss,  
     shock and grief 
• Rescue for any lost in the rubble 
 
Firefighters used 19 of the 23 macrocognitive processes, listed in Table 1, included in the model 
[Note: Table 1 includes the two new macrocognitive codes that were a product of this research, 
22 and 23]. This includes all codes except: knowledge object (ko) development, which requires 
pictures and icons; individual visualization and representation of meaning (vrm), which requires 
visual aids; iterative information collection and analysis (ica), which entails collecting and 
analyzing information without mentioning a solution, and solution adjustment against goal 
(saag) and exit criteria, where the team compares the solution option against goal and exit 
criteria. These four macrocognitive processes did not pertain to the FDNY radio communications 
for either task- or standard operating procedures (SOP)-specific reasons.   
 
Both ko and vrm are not possible on the radio (because the handie talkies do not include a video 
screen), but are used in the incident command center in the lobby of the two towers using the 
board with the location of the fire, operations post, staging area, and responding units, and also at 
the dispatcher’s office with the map of the location of all the responding units. No 
communications were coded as ica because use of the FDNY highly-refined SOP dictates that 
firefighters always comment and collaborate towards a solution with each speech turn (in other 
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 words, they always noted what they were doing about a reported situation, as they reported on a 
situation), due to the inherent time crunch. In terms of use of saag, the firefighters did not think 
they needed to think about their exit strategy as they never got to complete their tasks.  
 
Of the total 1620 total speech turns for the firefighters, 849 (52%) were coded as miscellaneous, 
and were thus removed from further analysis, leaving 771 speech turns. (Communications were 
coded as misc when it was simply an acknowledgement of receipt of the message, or an initial 
attempt to get the attention of the person for whom the message was intended. These misc 
communications are important for closed-loop communications, for example, where it is 
important to let the message sender know the message was received, e.g., “roger,” or “10-4.”)  
 
The most frequently used macrocognitive processes, in order of usage included: (41%) iterative 
team knowledge development (itk): indicating the team was asking lots of questions. This raises 
the issue of how to alleviate the need for so many questions and the very high level message 
traffic? (27%) – Developing team knowledge (tk): which refers to sharing knowledge with fellow 
firefighters and passing knowledge back to the dispatcher; (12%) – Course of action (coa): 
telling the dispatcher and/or other responding units what to do; (7%) – Request take action (rta): 
Requesting something of the dispatcher or responding units; (3%) – Constructing team mental 
model (cmm): (2%) – Developing common understanding (cu); and (2%)– Individual mental 
model (imm): Individuals contributing to the team’s mental model.  
 
Taking Actions as Part of Problem Solving  
Much of the radio communication revolves around asking fellow firefighters to respond or to do 
something towards the team’s goal. This is seen in codes 22 and 23 in Table 1: course of action 
(coa, 12%) and request to take action (rta, 7%). These codes show the firefighters taking actions 
to move toward accomplishing their end goals, with the knowledge that they do not have to carry 
out the plan of action themselves with the capacity to ask for support from their fellow 
responders. These new macrocognitive categories both entail a decision by the team member that 
an action needs to be taken.  
 
Patterns of Team Collaboration 
Since the FDNY team communications data from Sept 11 is richer than what can be represented 
by numbers in a table, we developed a way to graphically depict the team’s pattern of 
collaboration to represent their traversing through the stages of the model of team collaboration. 
One way to gain insight into a team’s cognitive processes employed during collaboration is to 
examine the pattern of communications, reflecting the macrocognitive processes as they 
communicated and responded to the fires in the towers of the WTC. Following our decision to 
divide the 2.5 hours of team communications into four phases corresponding to the four major 
events of 9-11, a subset of the 771 speech turns was selected to characterize and graphically 
represent the team’s cognitive processing of those events in relation to the macrocognitive 
processes included in the model. Criteria for selecting speech turns were when (a) a new topic 
was discussed or (b) a significant request was made for a team member to take action or a course 
of action was initiated. One of the authors read through the transcript and noted each time a new 
topic or event occurred in the transcript or a significant course of action was issued. A second 
author reviewed the communications selected for inclusion in these figures and made some 
minor adjustments.  
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 Figures 2a and 2b depict this high-level representation of the firefighters’ collaborative pattern as 
they responded to the first event: When the first plane hit the North Tower of the WTC. The goal 
was to show the order in which the firefighters used the macrocognitive processes during the first 
phase of the Sept. 11 attack to represent the flow of their team cognition in response to the 
situation. This figure (2a-b) represents the macrocognitive processes employed by the FDNY 
team during the first 16 minutes of the transcript which includes 209 speech turns: This equals a 
mean of 13 speech turns/minute, indicating the rate of communications was fairly dense.  We see 
that the collaborative process was highly iterative in that the team moved back and forth many 
times between the knowledge construction stage and the other stages, and also initiated several 






Figure 2a-b.  Pattern of Team Collaboration Used by Firefighters on Sept. 11. 
 
The lines represent the order in which the team moved through the macrocognitive stages 
included in the model. For example, in Figure 2a, the first speech turn involved the initial state-
ment that “We just had a plane crash into upper floors of the World Trade Center.” (team 
knowledge, tk) In this same speech turn, this firefighter issued the course of action to “Transmit a 
2nd alarm and start relocating companies into the area.” (Fire Department of the City of New 
York, 2001). This initial sizing up of the situation resulted in the immediate decision to do 
something about the situation (e.g., issue a coa to bring more firefighting assets to the scene).   
 
The goal for developing this set of figures was to provide a sense of how the team progressed 
through the phases included in the model as they dealt with their task. Two new coding 
categories are included in these figures (these new categories were added as a result of the 
analysis conducted for the three tasks reported here). Issuing a course of action (coa) and request 
take action (rta) are the by-product of the previous cognitive processing that occurred up to the 
decision to issue the coa/rta. Therefore, coa and rta are represented in a fifth column – outside 
the four columns that represent the four stages included in the original model of team 
collaboration.  
 
At 08:47 Battalion 1 called the Manhattan dispatcher to report the crash (team knowledge 
development, tk) and to request a second alarm, providing more units at the scene (course of 
action, coa). As more units called in to report the crash (various tk’s), the dispatcher was able to 
form a mental model of what had occurred. Relaying knowledge back to the dispatcher is critical 
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 as they are not located at the scene of the attack; anything the dispatcher knows comes from field 
reports from the firefighters.   
 
Once on site it became clear to the firefighters that the crash might have been an intentional 
terror attack (individual mental model construction, (imm), and this caused the team’s mental 
model to change (convergence of individual mental model (cmm) to a team mental model,). In a 
matter of minutes the FDNY moved through all four stages of the model of team collaboration: 
knowledge construction and collaborative team problem solving into team consensus and taking 
action as the team of firefighters agreed that more units were needed to save the many people 
trapped inside the buildings. Their speed of collecting information and making decisions saved 






Figure 3a-d.  Collaboration Pattern of Firefighters (2nd Plane hits North Tower). 
 
Moving into taking action, they called for third and fourth alarms, revising their initial plan. 
Furthermore, when the second plane hit the South Tower, they had to further re-evaluate their 
solution, calling for a fifth alarm, and divide their resources between the two tower lobbies for 
command posts. Looking at the attack on the WTC on Sept. 11 as one large problem, the FDNY 
never reached the ultimate outcome evaluation and revision stage. Their mental model did not 
include the possibility that the buildings would completely collapse. The firefighters were under 
the impression that they were working within a much larger time frame.              
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 Figures 3a–3d show a sample of the team communications during phase two of the attack on the 
WTC. For example, the communications for phase two began with the statement ‘You have a 
second plane into the other tower of the World Trade Center, major fire.’ (#1, in Figure 3 (tk).  
Table 3 includes the set of team communications selected for representation in the figure 3a-d 
that depict the team collaboration pattern for the FDNY during phase two, when the second plane 
hit the WTC. (These communications are a subset of the overall communications that that 
transpired during this phase (9:03-9:58) and were selected to represent the major topics discussed 
and actions taken during this time period.)  
 
Table 3.  Communications Selected to Represent Firefighters’ Pattern of Team 
Collaboration During Phase 2 of the Attack on the World Trade Center.1 
 
  9:02am United flight 175 flies into the South Tower of the WTC 
Turn 
# 
Time Team Communication Code
  1.   9:03 F. You have a second plane into the other tower of the Trade Center, major fire. tk 
  2. 9:03 Be advised on the 83rd floor, room 8311, we have people trapped, room 8311,  
83rd floor. Car 4 David acknowledge. 
tk 
  3. 9:04 F. I'm on the F.D.R. Drive. Definitely something hit the second tower, possibly  
two-thirds of the way up. You've got visible fire showing out there. 
cmm 
  4. 9:05 He would recommend you transmit a fifth alarm for that tower as well. cs 
  5. 9:06 Best to have the [M.C.C.?] and have our personnel be secure here at this location. sa 
  6. 9;06 D. All right. Engine 1-4 remain in service at this time. Standby. coa 
  7. 9:06 F. All right, 10-4. Division 3 to Manhattan, call leader Car 4 David on the scene, coa 
  8. 9:07 F. Did you give me the box that I'm being assigned to, K? itk 
  9. 9:08 All units responding into No. 1 World Trade Center and No. 2 World Trade Center,  
bring all additional S.D.B.A.[?] bottles to the front of the building. All units to box  
8087 and 998, No. 1 and No. 2 World Trade Center, bring your extra S.C.B.A.  
bottles to the front of the building, as per the division. 
coa 
10. 9:09 F. ... tower would you like us to be starting into, Tower 1 or Tower 2, K? itk 
11. 9:10 D. You're going to 2 World Trade Center, K, two. itk 
12. 9:10 F. I can't pick up the five units that you assigned to my system on. Have you got it  
in the computer yet, K? 
itk 
 
13. 9:11 F. ... 1-0, inform everyone assigned to the scene responding on West Street or Liberty  
Street not to pull up in front of the building. We have ambulances and everybody else  
pulling up and we've got debris falling from the building. They have to stop short of the  
building either north or south. 
cmm 
 
14. 9:13 F. Would you advise the mobile command vehicle to come in on West and  
Liberty Street, West and Liberty Street, K. 
coa 
 
15. 9:14 D. You want them over on the West Side? itk 
16. 9:16 D. Car 3 are you 84 the box?   
F. We are 10-84 the box. We are at West and Vessey, K. 
itk 
 
17. 9:16 D. All right. Listen I have some floors for you to check out coa 
18. 9:16 Car 3, in building two, the No. 8-2 floor, the No. 8-8 floor and No. 8-9 floor.  






D. O.K., the 83rd floor in building one; the 104th floor; the 103rd floor, northwest corner, 




20.  F. We're the marine division, we will position by the Brooklyn Bridge for a  
possible transport of men and equipment to Manhattan. 
tk 
21. 9:19 F. Have Field Comm. report in front of the Financial District Building on  
West Street ... American Express immediately. 
coa 
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 22. 9:19 F. Give me the company identifications that are coming to 2 World Trade  
Center. Just read them down. 
D. All right, 10-4: Engine 2-1-1, Ladder [interference], Engine 2-2, Engine 5-3, Engine 4-
0, Division 3, Battalion 1-0, Battalion 1-2, Ladder 1-6, Ladder 2, Ladder 1-3, Engine 2-2-1, 
Engine 2-3, Engine 2-0-9, Engine 2-1-2, Engine 2-7-9, Engine 2-3-0, Engine 2-2-9, Engine 
2-3-5, Engine 2-2-0, Engine 2-1-6, Engine 2-1-7, Engine 2-3-8, Engine 2-1-4, Ladder 12, 
Ladder 1-1-8, Ladder 7, Ladder 2-4, High Rise 1 and Battalion 1-1, Engine 7-4, Engine 7-
6, Engine 4-7, Engine 5-8, Engine 9-1, Ladder 2-2, Ladder 2-5, Ladder 3-5, Four Truck 
and Ladder 2-1. 
itk 
 
23. 9:22 D. All right, Field Comm. No. 1 World Trade Center, the 1-0-3 floor, southwest corner and 
northwest corner, reported to be 100 people overcome at that location. Repeating, No. 1 
World Trade Center, 103rd floor, northwest [interference] corner, reported to be 100 
people in that location. Also, Ladder 3 is reporting on the 35th floor going up on the 
stairwell they've got numerous injuries, treating numerous injuries from burns occupied in 
the stairwell at this time. Field Comm. receive. 
ct 
 
24. 9:24 F. Brooklyn Dispatch. Urgent, people trapped, 5 World Trade on the 8-0 floor; 3 World 
Trade, that's the 1-0-1 floor and the 1-0-2 floor. Manhattan receive? 
cu 
 
25. 9:27 F. Have M.S.U. activate all their spares and bring all their spares and all spare bottles to the 
scene of the fifth alarm, No. 1 World Trade Center, K. 
coa 
 
26. 9:27 D. Field Comm., No. 2 World Trade Center on the 8-3 and the 8-4 floors and the 8-2 floor, 
people trapped at this time. 
cu 
 
27. 9:30 F. Contact the units, fifth alarm, coming down for No. 2 World Trade Center, contact them 
individually and get them to acknowledge the fact that they are to come to Liberty and 
West, Liberty and West, K. 
coa 
 
 9:30 F. Marine 6 to Manhattan, in the event of a transport problem into Manhattan we can 
establish a staging area at our quarters. 
sa 
 
  D. Is that going to be for No. 2 or No. 1 World Trade.  
  F. Wasn't sure. I'd say go with both.  
1 (Fire Department of the City of New York, 2001.) 
 
The focus of the collaboration is to keep all team members apprised of the situation so that all 
team members can maintain overall situation awareness, especially when dealing with as large a 
problem situation as the attack on the WTC. As was the case with air warfare and MIO teams, 
the 9-11 firefighters collaborated more about the ‘front end’ of the problem: ‘What’s going on?’ 
A much smaller percentage of communications were devoted to collaboration during the team 
consensus and outcome evaluation and revision phases of the model. For both air warfare and the 
firefighters many decisions were made all along the way of dealing with the problem as opposed 
to making one big final decision (course of actions) and reaching a consensus on that course of 
action. If this same pattern holds for other examples of team collaboration it has implications for 
designing collaboration systems.  
 
The iterative pattern of moving back and forth between the phases of the model continues during 
the second phase of the FDNY communications, depicted in Figure 3. The team moves between 
knowledge construction and team problem solving and many times issues a course of action and 
then moves back to building additional team knowledge. In some cases the team communications 
move into the team problem solving and team consensus stages, but the majority of 
communications entail knowledge construction and taking action. 
 
The patterns included in Figures 2a-b and 3a-d depict the highly iterative process used by the 
FDNY. Each time they noticed something new they immediately issued a course of action to deal 
with their new understanding of the situation. This pattern reflects the finely-honed SOP that has 
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 evolved over many years of use and refinement. Firefighters are trained to ‘size up’ the situation 
and then report what they are doing about it. Information gathering was an on-going process 




Figure 4a-b.  Collaboration Pattern of Firefighters (The South Tower Collapsed). 
 
As seen in both Figures 2a-b and 3a-d, the team’s collaboration involved a highly iterative 
process. The pattern shows that each time they noticed something new, that is, when the 
fire/situation had progressed to another stage, they often immediately issued a course of action to 
deal with their new understanding of the situation. For example the first utterance in Phase 1, 
shown in Figure 2, was to inform other team members that “We just had a plane crash into upper 
floors of the WTC.” (team knowledge, tk) In this same speech turn, this firefighter issues the 
course of action to “Transmit a 2nd alarm and start relocating companies into the area.” (coa) It is 
important to note that in the first speech turn they were taking action. During speech turns 3-5 
(Figure 2) (tk) firefighters are describing the situation to others, the last one was “we have a 
number of floors on fire.” (tk)  In speech turn #6 a team member issued another coa: “Transmit a 
third alarm throughout the staging area at Vessey and West St. As the third alarm assignment 
goes into that area, the second alarm assignment report to the bldg.” Speech turn #7 was: 
“…looked like it was intentional. Inform all units coming in from the back it could be a terror 







Figure 5a-c.  Collaboration Pattern of Firefighters (The North Tower Collapsed). 
 
The team kept moving back to the knowledge construction stage the entire time because they 
were constantly passing information and making mental model adjustments to keep each other 
and the dispatcher informed of changes at the scene. When the South tower collapsed the mission 
in the North tower became one of strict evacuation. Most of the collaborative team problem 
solving was done at the Incident Command posts, where the Chiefs collaborated to create a plan 
while they filtered information for currency and factualness.  
 
Team Consensus. FDNY Chiefs at the scene were able to decide on solution options quickly 
because the FDNY SOP for regular response options was applicable for many instances.  
However, dealing with an attack on scale of Sept 11 meant there were cases were SOPs were not 
available. Fire chiefs moved between collaborative team problem solving and team consensus 
stages regarding solution options for various problems. 
 
Outcome Evaluation and Revision. For smaller, more manageable problems, the FDNY was 
able to reach a consensus and go through entire collaborative cycle. For example, getting 
firefighters down via elevators usually works, but plans were modified to use stairs to climb to 
the fire. For the larger problem of evacuating civilians and putting out the fire, this final goal was 
never reached because buildings collapsed before they had time to see their solution through to 
completion. 
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Figure 6a-c.  Collaboration Pattern for Air Warfare Team. 
 
A different pattern of collaboration is evident in figure 6a-c, which depicts a high-level 
representation of the macrocognitive processes employed by the air warfare team. The vast 
majority of their communications involved macrocognitive processes during the knowledge 






Figure 7a-c.  Collaboration Pattern for Maritime Interdiction Operations Team. 
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 As shown in Figure 7a-c, the MIO team engaged in more team problem solving in addition to 
knowledge construction and decision to take action. 
 
New Coding Categories: Decision to Taking Action 
Many critical tasks that involve team collaboration include team members taking action in 
addition to developing situation awareness and agreeing on a final COA. Various actions are 
taken as part of the overall information gathering process (e.g., MIOs, air warfare, firefighters, 
etc.). Problem-solving tasks also involve taking actions as part of the overall decision making 
and COA implementation. Many tasks involve a series of decision making and action taking in 
order to accomplish the mission. For example, in MIOs members of the boarding party 
physically search the ship using sensing equipment to take various readings which are sent to 
experts at reachback centers for analysis. In some cases, members of the boarding party are then 
asked to take additional readings to provide more fine-grained data that will help more precisely 
determine the type of cargo on the ship. Similarly, biometric data and video data is collected and 
sent back for analysis. This process of physically searching the ship for contraband cargo and 
suspect people entails a series of actions, thus, many speech turns involve requesting a team 
member to take an action. These requests can involve one team member to another (peer-to-peer 
situation) or a superior talking to a subordinate.  
 
Two new coding categories were added to the set of macrocognitive process definitions that are 
included in the model. The first involves a person in command issuing an order regarding a 
course of action, that is, a person with higher rank tells them to take some specific action against 
a potential threat track. This could include issuing verbal warnings, illuminating or locking-on 
with radar, developing a firing solution, covering with missiles, etc. Several examples for both of 
these new coding categories are listed in Tables 4 and 5 to illustrate the qualitative difference 
between issuing and order doe a COA and request take action – where one peer asks another peer 
to do something.  
 
Distinctions between these two new categories that involve a decision to take action are the (1) 
relationship between the people and (2) the urgency the action requires. Issuing an order 
regarding a course of action involves a person with higher rank (e.g., commanding officer 
speaking to the tactical action officer (TAO), or the TAO speaking to one of the enlisted system 
operators), telling a subordinate to take some specific action against a potential threat track. 
Table 4 lists examples of courses of action (coa) found in the three decision-making domains 
analyzed. These actions might include issuing verbal warnings, illuminating or locking-on with 
radar, developing a firing solution, covering with missiles, etc. Request a team member take 
action refers to telling a team member to do something but it is not a direct action against a threat 
track. For example, “Can you try and change 7006 and 7005 to assumed hostile?  I keep trying 
and can’t get it to do it.”  
 
Table 4. Examples of Course of Action (coa) Macrocognitive Process. 
 
9-11 Firefighters Transmit a second alarm and start relocating companies into the area. 
 Send every available ambulance, everything you’ve got, to the WTC.  
 All units respond into West St. Transmit a 10-60 also. 
 Get us a staging area…somewhere on West St.  
 I want all but one of them here.  
 Division to Manhattan calling Car 4 David K. 
 Units calling Manhattan, one at a time. 
 18
  All incoming units into World 1 and World 2 are to bring additional cylinders.  
MIO Search team will report size of material and its current containment  
condition; then make recommendations.  
 But, if you have plutonium, you need to confiscate.   
Air Warfare Cover tracks 7005 and 7006 with birds  
 Cover 8032 (TN 7013) with standard missile also generate a SWG 1A solution.     
 
The second new coding category is request team member take an action, which involves asking a 
team member to do something. Table 5 lists examples of request take action (tra) found in the 
three decision-making domains analyzed. The difference between these two categories is that the 
later does not involve a direct action against a threat track, e.g., ‘Can you try and change 7006 
and 7005 to assumed hostile?’ Much of the radio communications for the firefighters also 
involves asking fellow firefighters to respond or do something towards the team’s goal. Request 
take action involves asking a team member to take an action that will help move the problem 
along in terms of accomplishing the overall mission, e.g, ‘Would you relocate the only rescue 
that’s not going to the Trade Center, put them in Rescue 1 in Manhattan, please,’ or: ‘Will you 
call our bosses downtown and have them secure the MCC?’ Rta is generally a type of action that 
has less urgency associated with it.  
 
A coa involves a superior telling a subordinate to do something and the nature of the action is 
more severe (e.g., firing a missile) RTA is usually peer-to-peer request and the action requested 
is of a lesser consequence. Differences between a coa and rta center on the degree of authority 
held by the speaker and the urgency with which the action needs to be executed.  
 
Table 5.  Examples of Request Take Action (rta) Macrocognitive Process. 
 
9-11 Firefighters We’re going to need the P.D. for security on the entire World Trade Center. 
 Please have ambulances respond to West Street.  
 Would you relocate the only rescue that’s not going to the Trade Center,  
put them in Rescue 1 in Manhattan, please. 
 Will you call our bosses downtown and have them secure the MCC? 
MIO Mark material for confiscation. 
 Recommend material be confiscated. 
 Make sure you handle carefully.  
 Unless positive that destination is country under full-scope IAEA  
Safeguards, need to confiscate. 
 Given multiple radiation hits and suspect equipment RECOMMEND Divert of  
entire ship to Friendly Port (If we are u/w) or detained and moved to a safe  
location (if in US) 
Air Warfare Let’s investigate with (combat air patrol) CAP.   
 Confirm that tracks originating from Iranian air space are designated unknown  
assumed hostile. 




Several trends are evident when examining the results depicted in Figures 2-7. First, all teams 
spent the majority of their time in the knowledge construction phase. The attack on the WTC was 
a very unique situation that did not resemble anything the FDNY had previously experienced. 
This high level of novelty more than likely contributed to the team needing to devote an 
inordinate amount of time to constructing their mental model of the situation.  
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 The second noteworthy point is that for both the firefighters on Sept. 11, and the air warfare and 
MIO teams, the overall collaboration process did not culminate in one final outcome. While in 
other firefighting scenarios the final outcome is putting out the fire, the team does not necessarily 
collaborate to decide on the final outcome, i.e., whether one option/ final plan is better than 
another. (For example, the way a team of representatives from several cities who are 
collaborating to decide on the best final plan for where to locate a trash incinerator or a nuclear 
storage facility would.) A third important point is that for the kinds of tactical decision-making 
problems reported here, many actions are taken all along the entire process of dealing with the 
situation, whether it involves dealing with potential air threats, a MIO, or a fire – and all these 
decisions and associated coas are critical to dealing with the situation. These may be considered 
mini-decisions in that they are not major or final decisions, however, they are all considered to 




For the 9-11 data, individual task knowledge development (itk) is by far the category with the 
greatest percentage of codes at 42%. Firefighters are asking a great deal of questions, and while 
asking questions is encouraged for exchanging team knowledge, it begs the question of whether 
there is a way to alleviate some of the questions by providing more information to the responding 
units and in providing a decision support tool. Many communications dealt with locations for 
staging areas. Incorporating a navigation system into the handie talkies could help a lot with map 
issues. This also applies to the category with the second highest number of codes, team 
knowledge development (tk), with 210 out of 771 (27%). 
 
Very few of the cognitive processes included in the team consensus stage were evident in the 
team communications that transpired during these three collaborative tasks. All three tasks are 
tactical level tasks; that is, these operations are conducted within a very short time period. Due to 
the speed of a potentially hostile aircraft, political/ economic pressure to conduct the MIO 
quickly, and for obvious reasons for the firefighters, these decisions need to be made within 
minutes, or even seconds, as the situation unfolds. In contrast, operational and strategic level 
operations occur over longer time intervals, e.g., weeks or months. More of the macrocognitive 
processes included in the collaborative team problem solving and team consensus stages may 
occur in collaborative problem-solving tasks that span a longer time period.  
 
During the collaborative team problem solving stage the most frequently used process varied 
between all three decision-making domains. The macrocognitive processes with the highest use 
for each decision-making domain were: air warfare–team shared understanding; MIO–iterative 
collection and analysis; firefighting–convergence of mental models. These differences reflect 
differences in the tasks performed for these three domains. Air warfare teams focus on 
developing team shared situation awareness regarding the status (threat/non-threat) of the various 
tracks (air and surface) in the vicinity of the ship. MIO teams focus on iterative collection of 
data, and receiving feedback on results of analysis of this data which drives additional data 
collection until they are certain regarding the types of materials found on the vessel. For the 9-11 
firefighting task, many completely unanticipated events occurred which made it necessary for the 
firefighters to develop a new mental model of the situation they were confronted with in 
response to each new event: a terrorist attack, the collapse of WTC 1, collapse of WTC 2, and 
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